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 English at the State
 University of New
 York at Stony Brook,
 is the author of /'The
 Multiple Plot in
 English Renaissance
 Drama and New
 Readings vs. Old
 Plays: Recent
 Trends in the Rein
­terpretation of Eng
­lish Renaissance
 Drama. To avoid
 any misconceptualiza
­tions, it should be
 noted that he is not
 and never has been
 the president of Yale
 University.
This is a kind of response to Michael Sprinker’s essay
 
in the last issue of Journal x on the TA strike at Yale
 in 1995-96, but like him I won
'
t be concentrating on  
the strike itself. Instead I want to look at some of the
 more general questions raised by it and by his essay,
 beginning with the relationship between capitalism
 and our colleges and universities. Sprinker’s analysis
 of the situation at Yale is based on an attempt to
 equate colleges/universities with capitalist 
factories, and the centerpiece of this effort is a chart in which
 he lists the 
groups
 of people in the academic hierar ­
chy, from TAs to trustees, and connects them with
 equal signs to 
groups
 in the factory hierarchy, from  
temporary workers to the board of directors
 (Sprinker 210). This is the equation that enables him
 to argue that graduate students are really 
workers
 and  
so are “exploited” by the appropriation of their “sur
­plus” labor (213, 
215). Despite 
his
 use of equal signs, however, and his  
insistence that the two hierarchies are “exactly” alike
 and march “to the very same tune, responding to
 identical imperatives” applied “with equal force”
 (210-11), the fact is that this isn’t 
an
 equation but an 
analogy and, 
like
 most analogies, it serves the analo-  
gist’s agenda by focusing only on similarities (real 
or alleged) between the two things that s/he wants to
 connect and
 
passing over their differences that weak ­
en this connection.1 The differenc s become obvious  
once we realize that his factory hierarchy omits two
 essential groups of people — the customers who buy
 the factory products and so 
provide
 its income, and  
the owners (shareholders) who put up the capital to
1
Levin: Capitalism and the Marxist Imaginary at Yale (and Elsewhere)
Published by eGrove, 2020
40 Journal x
operate the factory and
 
reap the profits from its income, or, in  Marxist parlance,  
from the “surplus labor” of its workers.2 The reason they’re omitted is obvious:
 when we add them to the academic hierarchy the analogy is in
 
big trouble. The  





 if we limit ourselves to undergraduate programs where virtually  
all TAs
 
work, the only  customers are the students (or  their  parents) who buy the  
product with their tuition.3 But this tuition income is always less than the cost
 of the programs, and so colleges operate at a loss, which 
means
 that the own ­
ers, instead of reaping a profit, have to make good the loss through taxes 
or
 the  
endowment. This in turn means that, since no profit is made from their 
work, no “surplus labor” in the Marxist sense is appropriated from the
 
TAs.
It seems clear, then, that Marx’s analysis of capitalism and “surplus labor”
 doesn’t apply to modern colleges or other nonprofit institutions, and there’s no
 reason why it should, since Marx wasn’t dealing with them.4 There is, howev
­er, another aspect of the Marxist tradition that impels believers to extend this
 analysis to all aspects of society, which I’ll call the Marxist “imaginary,” using
 the term loosely to draw on both Lacan’s concept of an infantile imaginary
 order of illusory unity prior to our entrance into the symbolic order, and
 Althusser’s concept of ideology as 
an
 imaginary or “mystified” relation to —  
and hence “misrecognition” of— social reality.5
Actually, the Marxist tradition has two distinct but related imaginaries.
 
One is the myth of “primitive communism,” 
an
 idyllic society in the childhood  
of the race
 
when there was no individuality or conflict and people lived togeth ­
er in perfect unity and harmony. Not all Marxists still believe in this, although
 it was recently revived in Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious and Frank
 Lentricchia’s call (before his conversion, of which more later) for
 
“a redemptive  
project” that will “make us whole again beyond confusion” (151).6 Nor is the
 idea limited to Marxists, since many other groups have similar myths of a
 utopia in the past from which we have fallen — the Garden of Eden for Jews
 and Christians, the Golden Age of the pagans, the good old days of the found
­ing fathers or simple small-town life for some reactionaries, and so on.7
The 
second
 and much more important Marxist imaginary is a view of the  
world as a Manichean conflict between the forces of good and evil. This too
 isn’t unique to Marxists; it’s shared by many other people, especially on the far
 right, although their definition of the two forces is obviously very
 
different. It’s  
often connected to the first imaginary, since those who believe in a lost utopia
 in the childhood of the race or nation
 
usually believe it was lost because of some  
evil entity that still operates today and must 
be
 opposed  by the good forces. For  
those who look back to the Garden of Eden, this enemy is literally Satan, and
 for those with other “edens” the enemy is typically given satanic qualities.
 Reactionaries do this to secular humanism or feminism or whatever they blame
 for
 
the loss of our earlier innocence, and Marxists do it  to private property, class  
division, and their modern embodiment in capitalism, which destroyed primi
­tive communism and so 
becomes
 their Satan or Evil Other (hereafter abbrevi­
ated EO). Stephen Greenblatt observes that Marxists see capitalism not “as a
 complex historical movement” in a complex and changing world but “as a uni
­tary demonic principle” (151), and this is borne out, for example, when Jim
2
Journal X, Vol. 3 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol3/iss1/4
Richard Levin 41
Neilson and Gregory Meyerson “identify capitalism as the engine behind glob
­
al suffering” (242), and when Sprinker-says that college officials who deal with
 capitalist enterprises are “sup [ping] with the devil” (212). It’s 
an
 analogy, to be  
sure, but it serves his agenda and reveals his mystification of capitalism as the
 EO — the Wicked Witch of the West who, like Crabby Appleton,8 is “rotten
 to the core.”
The Manicheanism of the Marxist imaginary dictates not only that capi
­
talism must be the EO locked in this struggle with the good (socialist) forces
 opposed to it but also that every other issue must 
be
 viewed as a struggle 
between two — and only two — sides, one totally good and the other totally
 evil, and that all these struggles must turn out to be the same. Sprinker makes
 this explicit in his final statement that “the fundamental social conflict in our
 time remains that between labor and capital” (217), or what he refers to in the
 same essay as the conflict between “workers” and “bosses” 
or
 “owners” (210,  
213, 215).9 He also divides all political positions into the good “progressive”
 camp that fights capitalism and the bosses/owners and the evil “conservative”
 camp that supports them (217). He makes a similar division between those
 who oppose the trend to “corporatize” the university (anti-capitalist progres
­sives) and those who support it (pro-capitalist conservatives) (211-12). He
 even divides literary critics into the same two camps: the bad conservatives
 who treat literature in aesthetic terms and the good progressives who treat it in
 sociological terms (213-14). The Yale TA strike 
becomes
 another example of  
this polarized division between good/progressive/workers and evil/conserva-
 tive/bosses. In fact he defines this polarization twice as a choice between two
 sides — “I know which side I’d rather be on” (213), and “we all have to get our
 heads straight about which side we’re on” (215) — just as in an earlier essay
 dealing with broader issues he insisted that “The only real question . . . is:
 Which side are you on?” (“Commentary” 116).
Sprinker’s Marxist imaginary (or these aspects of it) can therefore be
 
summed up in a little chart, which I offer as 
an
 explanation of his chart of the  





capital, bosses, owners vs. labor, workers
conservative vs. progressive
corporatized university vs. uncorporatized university
aesthetic criticism vs. sociological criticism
Yale administration vs. Yale
 
TAs
I call this an “imaginary” because, as in Althusser’s definition of ideology, it pre
­
sents those interpellated into it with a mystified 
misrecognition
 of social reality,  
which doesn’t come neatly li ed up into good and evil sides. It also resembles
 Lacan’s imaginary since it’s a simplistic and 
childish
 view of life — exemplified in 
folklore, fairy tales, and children’s literature and TV programs — that erases all
 complexities, nuances, and 
uncertainties.
3
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It’s easy to 
show
 that each of  Sprinker’s binaries is a mystification or mis ­
recognition of reality, beginning with the opposition of labor and capital that’s
 supposed to underlie all the others since it’s “the fundamental social conflict in
 our time.” He says that “You don’t have to be an old-fashioned marxist to rec
­ognize” this (217), but in fact you do have to be a Marxist to “recognize” (that
 is, misrecognize) it, because anyone else will see that the evidence against it is
 overwhelming. It’s true that in capitalist societies there are always conflicts
 between labor and capital, but they’re usually dealt with by a series of short
­term solutions through negotiation, litigation, or legislation. In many parts of
 the world, however, the most fundamental, intractable, and violent social con
­flicts are between racial/ethnic or religious or regional 
groups,
 and while eco ­
nomic class plays a part in some of them, it’s usually a minor one. Indeed the
 most important social conflict in our time involving labor as an entity was in
 Poland, where organized workers after a long struggle (“class warfare”?) over
­threw their Marxist rulers, who clearly 
were
 the “bosses” and I suppose could  
be considered “capital” (“state capitalism”?), but I don’t think that’s the kind of
 conflict Sprinker has in mind. The evidence shows that there’s 
no
 fundamental  
social conflict; there are instead many kinds of social conflicts that may be
 interrelated in many ways but 
aren
’t reducible to any one kind. But this appeal 
to evidence won’t affect Marxists (who could dismiss it as “empiricist”), since
 their imaginary always already knows that there must
 
be a fundamental conflict  
and what it must be.
The evidence also contradicts Sprinker’s division of political positions into
 
evil “conservatives” and good “
progressives.
” For one thing, it fails to account  
for centrists or liberals — a matter of some interest to me since I was recently
 accused
 
by  a  Marxist of being “a self-confessed liberal” (Drakakis, Review 406),  
which I self-confess is true — and it also fails to distinguish conservatives from
 reactionaries. Presumably, since the imaginary dictates that there are only two
 sides, all these non-progressives must be lumped together as evil.10 But even
 when we restrict ourselves to the “progressives” we’re in trouble, since we can’t
 tell if
 
this is a code word for Marxists or if it includes non-Marxist feminist,  
black, and gay activitists who are also trying to bring about a better society but
 aren’t trying to bring down capitalism. And we’re still in trouble even if we’re
 restricted to Marxists. Is Sprinker on the same side as Stalinists or Pol-Potists
 or Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, who, as we’ll see, doesn’t want to be on 
his
 side? The  
evidence tells us that there are many political positions, and while they can be
 arranged roughly on a continuum (although even this creates problems at each
 end — how do we determine if Zavarzadeh is more or less “progessive” than
 Sprinker?), they can’t be reduced to two opposing sides.
The same objections apply to the treatment of what Sprinker calls the cor
­
poratizing of the university — the growing trend to run universities like busi
ness corporations. Since his Marxist imaginary defines corporations (that is,
 capitalism) as the EO, any attempt by the university to imitate or traffic with
 them must also be evil, and so academics must line up on two polarized sides
 — the good guys
 
who oppose the trend and the bad guys who support  it — and  
these groups must in turn be equated to the polarized political sides, with the
 former group as “progressive” and the latter “conservative.” But Jeffrey
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Williams demonstrates that opposition to this trend runs across the entire
 
political spectrum, from reactionaries who want to return to the good old days
 when the university was an elitist ivory tower unsullied by capitalism, to radi
­cals who want it to be 
an
 instrument for overthrowing capitalism.11 And lib ­
erals like me avoid blanket a priori endorsements or rejections of the trend
 because we want to judge each manifestation on its merits. We certainly
 oppose any “corporatizing”
 
that  interferes with the university’s educational mis ­
sion, but since we don’t believe that capitalism is inherently evil, we won’t
 assume that every attempt
 
to imitate a corporation by working for greater  econ ­
omy and efficiency is necessarily a bad thing.
From this perspective some of Sprinker’s ghastly examples of the trend
 
don’t seem very ghastly. One such example is the decision of Oregon State
 University to turn over its food services in the student union, which were run
 at a loss, to a Pepsi subsidiary (211-12). The “evil” here is supposed to be self-
 evident, but there’s no reason
 
why a university should be in the restaurant  busi ­
ness, and there’s good reason to
 
believe that a company specializing in this  
would, if properly monitored, provide better service to the students.12 It’s also
 hard to see what’s wrong with transforming 
an
 annual loss into an annual  
income that will go to the general operating fund that could 
be
 used, among  
other things, to increase TA salaries.
His most amusing example comes from Tufts University where, he says,
 
“bribes” were “spread around” to have the registrar’s phone play an advertise
­ment for Coca 
Cola,
 a “product that . . . will dissolve nails left in it overnight”  
(212). I haven’t heard that bobe-mayse (along with the one about the aphrodisi
­ac effect of mixing Coke and aspirin) since my teens,13 but it explains a puzzling
 remark of Malcolm Evans, another Marxist, who laments the end of Mao’s Cul
­tural Revolution when “Coca-Cola advertisements . . . returned to Beijing”
 (255). I wondered why 
he
 thinks that drinking a Coke is worse than being  
“struggled” by Red Guards and being imprisoned or banished to a “re-educa
­tion” labor camp (the fate of millions of innocent victims of this revolution), but
 now
 
I realize that he, like Sprinker, sees Coke as a symbol of capitalism and so  
as the EO.14 Nor is there any need to assume bribery; the company paid Tufts
 for the right to advertise and the money went into the aforementioned operat
­ing fund. The deal does sound rather tacky, but it’s not evil and won’t have any
 harmful effect on the students’ education or their stomachs.
The attempt to extend the Marxist imaginary to literary criticism is no
 
more successful. Sprinker wants to divide all critics into two sides, those who
 view literature as a repository of “enduring, historically unchanging
 
value,” and  
those who view it in “sociological” terms as “imbricated in . . . socio-political
 relations,” and he wants to line them up with his two political sides, the bad
 conservatives and good progressives (213-14). But the political line-up won’t
 work. Some of the most prominent “sociological” critics today are the New
 Historicists, who 
aren
’t progressive in the Marxist sense (witness Greenblatt’s  
comment on Marxism quoted earlier), and the old historical critics were “soci
­ological” but were often quite conservative politically. The division of the field
 into two kinds of criticism won’t work either. It omits the psychological crit
­ics, who don’t fit into either camp, and it omits critics like me who fit into both
5
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— who believe that literary works are “imbricated” in their time and place, but
 
that some of them have a more general appeal (not unchanging or universal)




imaginary runs into the same kind of trouble  when it’s applied  
to the Yale TA strike. Since it can t count past two, it produces another either-
 
or
 binary in Sprinker’s essay: good progressives, who view the TAs as workers  
and support them, versus bad conservatives,
 
who view them as student-appren ­
tices and support the administration. But again life isn’t that simple. Some
 people support the TAs but oppose their grade strike,15 while others support
 the administration but 
oppose
 its punishment of the strikers. There are also  
other
 
intermediate positions, and  I’ll bet my  next sabbatical  that way  out on the  
far left there are ultra-progressives calling down a plague on both houses
 because the TAs are merely “union reformists” who 
aren
’t trying to bring down  
capitalism and so are no better than the administration.
Moreover, our attitude toward the TAs doesn’t depend on whether we
 
accept Sprinker’s equation of a university to a factory or the equation of it to a
 medieval guild that is proposed by some administration supporters, and that he
 dismisses as “the stupidities” they “spouted” (210). When I argued that the first
 equation is really an analogy that focuses on similarities that serve the analo-
 gist’s agenda and passes over differences that don’t, I wasn’t suggesting that we
 replace it with the second equation, which is also 
an
 analogy that serves the  
same purpose. One equation/analogy is thus no more (or less) “stupid” than the
 other, but we don’t have to 
choose
 between them because, as Crystal Bar-  
tolovich demonstrates in her perceptive essay on the strike in the same issue of
 Jx (225), the
 
TAs are both workers and student-apprentices.16 Nor is there any  
way 
to
 determine which role is more fundamental or “real,” unless one is inter ­
pellated into the Marxist imaginary and so knows a priori that the boss vs.
 worker relationship is always the fundamental reality.
There is, however, a principle (not an analogy) that doesn’t require a choice
 
between these two roles and that I think should determine our attitude toward
 the TAs. Since I’
m
 a  “self-confessed  liberal,” it won’t  be surprising to learn that  
this is the principle of liberal individualism, which recognizes that the TAs, in
 addition to being workers and apprentices, are also informed, rational adults
 and so are the best judges of their own interests — certainly
 
better judges than  
the faculty or administration, who have their own interests at stake.17 If then
 they decide that it’s in their interests to form a union and 
to
 strike, they should  
have the right 
to
 do this (a right, I might add, that they wouldn’t have under  





the traditional liberal alliance with organized labor that goes  
back at least as 
far
 as the New Deal.
Sprinker’s Marxist imaginary isn’t even needed to judge the TA’s grievances.
 To adapt his own statement, you don’t have to be a Marxist to recognize that
 they’re exploited.— all you have to do is compare what they’re paid per course
 with what Assistant Professors are paid. The imaginary is not only unnecessary
 here but is in fact obfuscatory, for it 
insists
 that the TAs will be exploited no  
matter how much they’re paid, since under capitalism all workers are exploited
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that no profits are produced by TAs). Even the CEOs (Chief Evil Others)  
of our major corporations and our major sports stars, with seven-digit salaries,
 are exploited, apparently, because they too "sell their labor for money” (the
 Marxist definition of
 
a worker) and, unlike TAs, really do produce profits for  
others. According to this logic, then, the only way to end the exploitation of
 TAs (and CEOs and sports stars) is not by raising their wages but by over
­throwing capitalism and establishing socialism, which is no help to the TAs in
 their present plight. (Of course, exploited workers in advanced capitalist
 
economi
es earn much more than unexploited workers in comparable jobs in  
socialist 
economies,
 but people trapped in the Marxist imaginary cant recog ­
nize this reality.)
The Marxist imaginary also interferes with our perception of and response
 
to the trend toward the “corporatizing” of our universities. This is a very real
 and very
 
serious problem, which has troubled many liberals and even some con ­
servatives, as I noted, but Sprinker’s analysis only muddies the waters. For one
 thing, he seems to 
be
 arguing against himself when he asserts that the univer ­
sity “is becoming more and more corporatized with each passing year” (211),
 because he can’t explain what
 
it was before this trend or how in  that earlier peri ­
od it managed to escape corporatization. In other passages he argues that
 under capitalism the university is necessarily a form (and servant) of corporate
 enterprise, and this is confirmed 
by
 his chart of equations,  which is supposed to  
apply to capitalist universities and factories at any time (it also applies, with a
 few changes in nomenclature, to socialist universities and factories, but that’s
 another story). Moreover, because his imaginary defines capitalism as the EO,
 all manifestations of the trend become evil, which makes it impossible 
to
 dis ­
criminate among them and even leads, as we saw 
in
 some of his examples (that  
awful Coke), to a tr vializing of the problem. It’s not likely, therefore, that this
 essay will persuade any non-Marxists to 
oppose
 the trend, but that may not be  
its purpose.
One indication that Sprinker 
isn
’t interested in persuading us is his indul ­
gence in a kind of name-calling, which is another effect of the Marxist imagi
­nary that misrecognizes all 
nonbelievers
 as the EO. People and organizations  
he disapproves of are “notorious,” “infamous,” “silly,” “benighted,” and traffic in
 “stupidities”; the people’s views are “spouted” rather than stated, their organiza
­tions are “spawned” rather than formed, and so on. And he regularly impugns
 the motives of these people: they accept “bribes,” as we saw (212), their argu
­ments are “just self-serving” (210), and they are “paid lackeys” (215); Sandra
 Gilbert and Frank Lentricchia are guilty of “a breathtaking gesture of bad faith”
 for renouncing the progressive views of literature that they “once professed to
 think”; and John Ellis decided that “attacking theory would likely bring him to
 the attention of some movers and shakers” (213).
He doesn’t explain why it’s “bad faith” to change one’s mind, or whether
 
this also applies to changes in the other direction. If a conservative converted
 to Marxism and renounced her former views, would Sprinker accuse her of “bad
 faith”? And he has no access to Ellis’s motives; he doesn’t have to, since the
 imaginary always already knows that the 
motives
 of the EO can never be sin-
7
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cere and so must be venal. Its only fair, then, that his own motives should be
 
impugned by a fellow Marxist, Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, who thinks he
'
s farther to  
the left than Sprinker and accuses him of “cynical pragmatism” because he
 serves the interests of “the Routledge-Verso cartel” (110).18
It’s hard to believe that Sprinker (or Zavarzadeh) expects to convince 
any­
one
 by this kind of personal attack, which  will turn off those  who aren’t lready  
convinced. I don’t engage in it and I don’t think I’
m
 smarter than the people  
I’
m
 arguing against or more sincere. (Indeed my restraint may itself  have an  
ulterior motive — the desire to reach those who are turned off by name-call
­ing.) I try to bear in mind Martin Mueller’s statement of “the simple truth that
 intelligence, insight, and integrity have been found [in people] very far to one’s
 political left and very far to one’s political right” (29).19 But if I were 
to descend to the personal level, the attitude that I’d adopt (and urge others to
 adopt) toward Marxists would 
be
 not anger but compassion. After all, it can’t  
be easy
 
to be a Marxist today. Think  of all the intellectual and emotional ener ­
gy that must be expended in denying what obviously happened: that  the Marx ­
ist imaginary has been abandoned (another “breathtaking gesture of bad
 
faith”?)  
in most of the countries where it operated, and even those countries that still
 have Marxist regimes are 
busy
 converting to market economies,20 so that just  
about the only true believers left are now holed up, completely isolated and
 completely impotent, in the academy. We can therefore expect to find in this
 pitiful remnant a lot of thrashing about, including some desperate clutches at
 straws (even their knowledge of children’s TV programs), personal attacks 
on liberals and each other, and compulsive intoning of the old discredited mantras





Marxist rhetoric deploys a number of other “interested” analogies as if  
they were equations: “wage slavery” that 
isn
’t really slavery, “class warfare” that  
’t really war, “economic violence” that isn’t really violent, “state capitalism”
 that 
isn
’t really capitalism, and “economic democracy,” “democratic centralism,”  
and “Democratic People’s Republic” (see note 20) that 
aren
’t really democratic.  
The first four are clearly meant to be dyslogistic and the last three eulogistic.
2.
 
For the sake of the argument I’m using the Marxist theory of surplus  
labor that Sprinker assumes, but I don’t believe it and don’t know of
 
any rep ­
utable economist who does. It’s based on the 
medieval
 doctrine that labor and  
its products have a “real”
 
value independent of the market, and it can’t stand up  
under the most obvious questions, which presumably is why Zavarzadeh won’t
 let us question it — he insists that it’s “an unsurpassable objectivity” that is
 “ineradicable” and “is not open to interpretation” (98).
3.
 
Graduate programs are more complex since many  of them derive part of  
their income from public or
 
private grants, but they don’t make a profit on this.  
A university endowment, of course, makes profits from its investments, but not
 from the operation of the university.
8





There’s a reference in Capital to a schoolmaster producing surplus value  
for his employer (644), but Marx
 
is thinking  here of a small, private elementary  
or secondary school that’s owned by one man who profits from it.
5.
 
In his introduction (11) . Kamps suggests that Althusser’s conception of  
(capitalist) ideology 
could
 be applied to the Marxists’ own ideology, which is  
what I’
ll
 be trying to do.
6.
 
Compare Plato’s Symposium 189E-193D, where Aristophanes says that  
humans 
were
 once round but were bisected by Zeus, so that each half now  
yearns to recover its original wholeness. But that’s not presented as history.
7.
 
I call this imaginary “Edenism” and discuss it, with more examples, in  




He was the villain in Tom Terrific, and I drag him in here to counter  
Sprinker’s claim that Marxists will win what he calls the “decisive battle” for
 students’ minds because they know about childrens’ TV programs and their
 opponents don’t (213-14).
9.
 
He sometimes conflates “bosses” and “owners,” but in a modern corpo ­
ration they are separate groups of people.
10.
 
Thus Drakakis, who calls me a “self-confessed liberal,” also calls me a  
“reactionary” in another essay published in the same year (“Terminator” 64),
 and Zavarzadeh relegates all those who are less “revolutionary” than he is
 (including many Marxists) to the same camp because they are “complicit”
 
with  
capitalism (92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, and so 
on.).
 The slogan of the old Popu ­
lar Front was “No enemies to the left!”
 
but the slogan of our new  academic pro ­
gressives seems to be “No friends to the right!”
11.
 




He objects that students now face a monopoly, but they also faced one  
under the earlier arrangement. There’s a long tradition of student complaints
 about the food in university-operated cafeterias and dining halls.
13.
 
I recall conducting an empirical (not, of course, empiricist) experiment  
by placing some nails of different kinds and sizes in ajar filled with Coca-Cola  
for a
 
week, but they suffered no ill effects. I also remember taking a Coke and  
an aspirin, with no beneficial effects.
14.
 
Jameson also laments the end of the Cultural Revolution and doesn’t  
mention its victims (Ideologies 2.208).




Moscow, which apparently is more horrible than Stalin’s purges,  
although they didn’t claim that Big Macs dissolve iron.
15.
 
Bérubé, who is certainly not a conservative and who strongly supports  
the TA union, points out that the grade strike pit it “against the interests of
 undergraduates and faculty alike, thus isolating the union politically” (40), and
 Bartolovich, who also argues for the 
TAs,
 wonders if “grade strikes are the best  
possible strategy
 
for academic unions to deploy” (230).
16.
 
Sprinker realizes that professors “are at once cultural intellectuals ... and  
also workers' (209), but this insight doesn’t extend to TAs.
17.
 
Bérubé shows that the “Yale  faculty had no direct stake' in the unioniza ­
tion of the TAs (48), but they obviously thought that they did.
9
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This is another example of Marxist name-calling, since Routledge-  
Verso obviously
 isn
’t a cartel. The title of his essay shows that Zavarzadeh also  
regards views that he disagrees with as "stupidity.”
19.
 
Compare Bartolovich’s conclusion that many who voted (as she did) for  
the MLA resolution condemning the
 
Yale administration and many who voted  
against it acted “thoughtfully” and “carefully” (230). It’s hard to imagine such
 a statement coming from an inhabitant of the Marxist imaginary.
20.
 
The only exception is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea where  
the imaginary
 
survives intact under Great Leader Kim Jong  II,  who was recent ­
ly
 
elected General Secretary of the Workers’ Party “by the Unanimous Will and  
Desire of the Korean People” (Committee A21), and who also happens to be
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